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by Richard C. Edwards

Economic Sophistication in Nineteenth
Century Congressional Tariff Debates
We are lost at once amidst the jargon of the schools of political economy.
Representative Mallory
February 28, 1824

(Annals of the Cong~ess)

0

NE of the most controversial economic issues confronting the
American public during the nineteenth century was that of protection. The plea for a protective tariff had been raised as soon as
the First Congress met in 1789. The issue was sharply debated off
and on throughout the nineteenth century but never finally resolved. There is now a large literature relating the outcome of this
issue to the economic and political interests of various involved
groups.
Little effort has been made, however, to assess the impact of the
tariff on economic growth, employment, and the dispersion of new
technology. Nor has a close examination been made of the thought
of Congressmen who participated in the tariff debates. To what extent can one characterize those debates as informed by a knowledge
of economic theory? What body of theory was available for them
to draw upon? In short, what was the intellecutal basis as perceived
and understood by the Congressmen themselves, of the tariff judgments which they made?
This paper attempts to answer those questions by scrutinizing the
tariff debates of 1824 and 1894 as case studies. Is there evidence in
the debates to indicate that Congressmen were perceptive to the
operation of a national economy? How economically knowledgeable
were they?
SOME PRELIMINARIES-A

MI3THODOLOGY

By "economic knowledge" I mean systemic, theoretical knowledge of the economy. As practical men, Congressmen knew a great
The author wishes to thank Professor Alexander Gerschenkron, who &st inspired
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Congressional Tariff Debates
deal about those particular segments of the economy in which they
were engaged or which affected them. My concern, however, is with
the Congressmen's understanding of the economy as a system, their
understanding not only of the parts but also of how the parts influence each other. It is only this broader knowledge that is appropriate for national policy formulation.
There are several limitations to this study that must be noticed
from the beginning. First, I shall not attempt to appraise the extent
to which economic arguments were persuasive to the members or
influential in determining votes. I shall ask only what economic
knowledge was displayed and not how behavior was affected by
it.l Second, I shall make no effort to trace the undoubted effects on
the expressions of Congressmen of their constituents' economic interests.
The third limitation is somewhat more serious methodologically.
Because for each case study I wish to survey an entire Congress, I
rely on the one source we have which records that Congress acting
as a unit, namely the transcript of its debates. If an investigator were
attempting to discover the economic knowledge of a certain member
of those Congresses, it is clear that he would not confine his study to
the man's speeches in Congress; in fact, it might be thought that
these speeches, being nearly barren of direct economic exposition,
would conceal more than they revealed of his expertise. However,
because my task concerns two entire Congresses this paper must deal
with the Congresses somewhat abstractly-treating them as if they
were composed of two homogeneous parts, the tariff supporters and
the free-traders. My concern is ascertaining whether or not there
existed systems of "political economy" that underlay these two positions, and if so, what they were. Therefore, despite the dangers
mentioned above, I shall rely solely on these debates for my data.
Further, I have limited this study to the debates in the House of
Representatives, which always debates tariff bills before they go to
the Senate. This limitation represents no serious restriction, since
the House generated more genuine controversy, and the time constraints placed on speakers kept the debates more germane. The
, ~ the 1894
source for the debates is the Congressional R e ~ o r d for
1 If our concern were behavioral, we should have to investigate the considerable
power of unsystematized ideas, even quite unsophisticated ones, to accomplish political objectives in a society which historically has been notable for its distrust of
systematic thought.
2 Congressional Record: Containing the Proceedings and Debates of the Fifty-
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debates, and its predecessor, the Annuls of CongressS for the earlier
debates. Although the Annuls is not quite a primary source, being a
compilation of the Congressional stenographers' notes, it records
nearly all of the debates verbatim, and thus there is no serious discrepancy between the Annuls and what the primary source might
be considered to have been.
Finally, this study must be qualified in two different ways, whose
effects hopefully cancel each other out. The first is that the models
described below result from an artificial synthesis of many men's
ideas, and I cannot claim that any one Congressman had systematized these ideas into a consistent model. What I do claim is that
all of these ideas were present in the debates and were used to advantage by the participants. The second qualification is that the
"free-trade" and "pro-tariff' models come as much from an intuitive
feel for the debates-derived from careful reading of the House
proceedings for each debate-as from the quotations presented below. For every statement quoted that concisely states a relevant idea,
there were many more that were less concise in statement or less
precise in content.
I have dealt at some length with these methodological problems
because they appear particularly acute in such a study-necessarily
qualitative and somewhat speculative-which involves abstracting
economic models from speeches made for entirely different ends.
Nevertheless, despite these limitations, the results are of considerable interest.

A t a r 8 primarily designed for protection was first seriously debated in the Congress of 1816. Domestic manufacturers had prospered during the period of non-tariff protection caused by the
wartime collapse of international commerce. In 1816, with the return of peace, the United States was flooded with foreign, primarily
British, manufactured goods. There was general agreement in the
Congress that some type of t a r 8 was needed to ease the adjustment.
The 1816 solution to the t a r 8 question was ambiguous in terms
of long-range policy. The Congressional debate focused on short-run
Third Congress, Second Sesston (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1894),
Parts I , 11, and Appendix, Part I .
3 The Annuls of the Congress of the United States, Eighteenth Congress, First
Session (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1854), Volumes 41 and 42.
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adjustments, and that portion of the debate which did involve longrun policy was generaly desultory. In the following years there was
increased pressure for general tariff protection for domestic industry
-pressures that culminated in the election of the 18th Congress in
1822, the first Congress elected under the census of 1820. In the first
session, a major revision of the tariff was introduced into the House
of Representatives. This tariff, known as the Tariff of 1824, was debated from December of 1823until April of 1824.
The debates cover roughly a thousand pages in the Annals, although for each side of the principal substantive arguments were
articulated by a few major speakers. The final vote passing the bill
strikingly demonstrated the regional codict of interests. Each of
the twelve proto-industrial Central States voted overwhelmingly in
favor of the bill, and as a group provided a 95 to 10 margin in favor:
Eleven other states, the mercantile Northeast and agricultural South,
all voted solidly against the bill, producing an 84 to 6 bulge in opposition.' Only the Maryland delegation was closely split, voting 5
to 4 against the bill6 A considerable portion of the debate was devoted to general economic principles; consequently, the passage of
the bill may be correctly interpreted as the result of the considered
economic judgment of that Congress concerning a policy of longrange protection. It is these debates, then, that I employ for my fist
case study.
One can begin his search for underlying economic conceptions,
or what will loosely be called models, by focusing first on the economic writers mentioned in the debates. My purpose is not to test
how much history of thought the Congress knew; rather, by reviewing their intellectual precursors, hopefully we can gain clues as to
their own conceptual schemes.
Foremost was, of course, Adam Smith. The Wealth of Nations,
published first in 1776, appears to have been common and almost
required reading, as judged by the frequency with which Smith's
name appears in the debates. His name is explicitly used at least
eight different times by different speakers: and many more refer4 Rhode Island, Connecticut, Vermont, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Deleware, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri.
5 Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
,
Mississip i, and Alabama.
Georgia, T e ~ e s s e e Louisiana,
8 The final vote is reported in AD&,
pp 2429-2430. Congressmen can be identified from Rapine, D., Congressional Directory, for the Second Session of the
Eighteenth Congress of the United States, (Washington City, 1824).
7 A n d , pp. 1559, 1678, 2178, 2222, 2233, 2372, 2391, 2403.
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ences are clearly directed to him (e.g., "Buy where you can buy
cheapest, is the maxim of the political economi~t"~).
Smith's arguments for free trade naturally suited those opposed to the tariff, and
his enormous infiuence in ordering their thinking will be noticed
later.
Ricardo's Principles of Political Economy and Taxation did not
appear until 1817, and although some of his pamphlets were available earlier, his name is not mentioned frequently. Because the
Principles is more purely theoretical than Wealth of Nations, it had
less appeal for the Congress. The free-trade group recognized that
Ricardo's work provided an intellectual underpinning for its positionY9but from the references to the work it appears that while
respected, its content remained generally obscure to the debate participants.
J. B. Say's Trait6 had some circulation among members of the
Congress, and perhaps it was through Say that most of Smith's arguments became known. Likewise, the "celebrated Malthus"lo was
generally recognized as a political economist of considerable stature.
There is little assurance that the speakers who appealed to these
latter economists had ever read their works, but they were at least
aware of the arguments presented by them. In any event, Adam
Smith's name appears to have been most prestigious, and his work
was clearly the most influential.
The works of these economists have since been accepted as genuine contributions to economic theory. Given the prevailing intellectual disfavor of tariffs, the tariff supporters were generally wont
to dismiss political economists as "abstract and theoretical"ll or "foreign speculative writers."12 One economist, Sir James Steuart, had
received considerable notice from the tariff advocates in the 1816
debates, since his Political Oeconomy provided some support for
the tariff position.13 By 1824, the theoretical triumph of the freetraders was so complete that not only was Steuart's name not invoked, but the balance-of-trade doctrine was called "idle and ridicexploded by all the enlightened political economists of
ulous,

...

8 Ibid., p. 1476.
9 Ibid., pp. 2144,2233,2235,2372.
10 Ibid., p. 1682.
11 Ibid., p. 2069.
1 2 Ibid., p. 1474.
13 See S. R. Sen, The Economics of

vard University Press, 1957).

Sir James Steuart (Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
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the day."14 However, Steuart's work continued to influence the debates in fact if not in name.
Aside from these more theoretical writers, the Congress of 1824
was familiar with many of the popular and contemporary economic
writers. Joseph Lowe15 was particularly studied because he presented some of the most valuable of the few available statisticsthose on British customs and currency. Both sides in the debate
made repeated reference to Lowe's work. Colquhoun16was popular
because he presented empirical matter in analytic terms; he attempted ". . . to paraphrase factually, as it were, the more popular
doctrines of the times."17 Laborde, Count Nesselrode, Matthew
Carey, and Dr. Seybert, contemporary American and European
economic observers, and were all quoted and used.
We see, then, that the Congress was generally familiar with both
the theoretic writings and the more popular contemporary materials.
On the free-trade side, the theorists had gained such sway as to
sweep the opposition from the field; by 1824, there were no intellectually respectable writers supporting the tariff position, so tariff
advocates were forced to depend upon the "practical statesmen" of
the day or upon such authors as Nesselrode and Lowe, who were
mostly problem-oriented. We shall later see this split mirrored in
the differing degrees of completeness manifested by the conceptual
schemes of the two groups.

The Free Trade Position
Let us now examine closely those conceptions that underlay the
free-trade arguments. We can view in detail the previously noted
intellectual debt owed to Adam Smith.
The "Real" Model. First, the free-traders had a clear Smithian
conception of the nature of national wealth: "The wealth of a nation
consists in the abundance of those articles which administer to the
necessities, the comforts, and the luxuries of life, according to the
existing habits of society."ls This notion of wealth, frequently repeated, is plainly free from any bullionist concept of wealth. But,
more importantly, it implies that anything that increases the stock
Buchanan quoting Webster, Annals, p. 1891.
Ibid., pp. 1923,1931, 1940, 1974, 1997,2021,2071.
Ibid., p. 2248.
J. A. Schumpeter, Histoy of Economic Analysis (New York: Oxford University
Press. 1954 ) D. 522n.
14
16
18
17

.
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of "those articles" increases the national wealth.lg This implication,
though seemingly simple, is of considerable importance to the early
nineteenth century legislator. In the first place, it induced the freetraders to begin asking relevant questions (e.g., what causes the
stock of "those articles" to increase?). But, more important, by focusing on real goods rather than their money values, this concept of
wealth removed from the analysis the economic element most confusing to the legislator: the relation of prices and the value of money
to production and income. It allowed the Congressmen to deal in
real quantities whose measurement was invariable. As a simplification, it was enormously helpful in arranging economic concepts in a
relevant order.
In attempting to answer the question of how a nation arrives at an
optimal resource allocation, the free-traders were led to consider
four aspects of economic behavior, the first three of which are derived almost directly from Smith:
1 ) The division of labor and subsequent exchange of products
were recognized as the fundamental means of increasing the stock
of goods available to society. Both tariff advocates and opponents
agreed that "[it is to mutual advantage] . . . that a man employs a
neighboring mechanic to make his boots and shoes, instead of
making them himself. . . ."20 Daniel Webster, in clear reference to
Smith's example of growing grapes in Scotland, lays out the need
for a division of labor:
if the world had but one clime, and but one soil; if all men had the same wants
and the same means
to gratify those wants . [then there would be no
reason for exchange]. But . we inhabit a various earth. We have reciprocal
wants and reciprocal means for gratifying one another's wants. This is the true
origin of commerce, . . an exchange of equivalents.21

...

..

. .

.

Similarly, the principle of exchange-that both parties gain because
each receives an article at least as dear to him as that which is given
up-was distinctly pointed out by Web~ter.2~
In fact, both sides
were willing to admit the advantages of a division of labor, between
individuals and between sections of the country; it was generally
19 While there is no explicit mention of an income flow, it is evident from the
speeches that the concept of increases in stock approximates a modem flow-of-income
wealth definition; the stock-flow problem was simply not recognized by the Congress.
20 Annals, Christopher Rankin ( Miss. ), p. 2019.
21 Ibid., Daniel Webster ( Mass. ) ,p. 2046.
22 Ibid., p. 2046.

.
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agreed that it was most advantageous for the South to grow cotton,
the North to produce manufactured goods, and the West to supply
the nation's foodstuffs.
It was only the free-trade advocates, however, who were willing
to extend the analysis to an international division of labor which
could be mutually advantageous: "Commerce between nations has
the same essential character as commerce between individual^."^^
Or again, "What odds does it make whether the communities are
separated by Goose Creek or the great A t l a n t i ~ ? "Given
~ ~ the basic
definition of national wealth mentioned above, we can see that the
advantages of division of labor and exchange, both internal and
foreign, were not lost upon the free-traders. The foreign-trade benefits of "buy where you can buy cheapest" constituted an important
defense of free trade in these debates.
2 ) Another Smithian tenet accepted wholeheartedly by the tariff
opponents was that of the "invisible hand" or self-interest as a socially desirable motivation. In a passage lifted almost directly from
the Wealth of Nations, P . P. Barbour proclaimed:

.

..

there is an instinct implanted in man . . which
. impels him to a perpetual
endeavor to better his conltion; that this principle, acting alike on all, without
concert, and without even looking to the public interest, every man in society
is constantly endeavoring to increase his portion of weath, and, consequently,
every man is laboring to add to the stock of pubIic wealth.25

Samuel Foot recognized the same idea but linked it directly with
the question of the tariff: "The greatest degree of national and individual wealth is obtained by permitting labor, skill, and capital
to find their own employment and investment unshackled, and encourage [sic] a free and unrestricted trade."26 The notion that unrestricted economic participants pursuing their self-interest reach
an optimal employment provided a further basis for attacking the
tariff bill. Several speakers declared that the tariff would divert resources from their normal occupations, and since the new occupations must be less profitable (otherwise resource owners would have
switched to them voluntarily), a less than optimal solution would
be
23
24
26
26
27

Zbid., Daniel Webster ( Mass. ), p. 2046.
Zbid., Robert Garnett (Va.), p. 2093.
Zbid., P. P. Barbour (Va.), p. 1923.
Zbid., Samuel Foot ( Conn. ), p. 2297.
See for example Zbid., p. 1923 ff.
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3) Competition was recognized as the force that regulated trade
and guaranteed the assumption that the national good would result
from the sum of private self-interest; Christopher Rankin makes this
position clear: "Capital, if permitted, will always find its place of
Competition . . [enables] you to purprofitable employment.
chase from those who can produce or manufacture cheapest. . .
You are not . . . subjected to the extortion of those from whom you
have no alternative but to buy at their own price^."'^ Competition
on the one hand ensured that prices would be forced down to the
minimum possible profitable level; on the other hand, competition
among alternative employers in the labor market was relied on to
ensure full employment: "If any man were to make his complaint to
me that he was without employment, I could tell him simply to go
to work. . .a remedy in the reach of e ~ e r y o n e . " ~ ~
4 ) Production was thought to depend upon a combination of capital and labol-?O (and presumably land), the exact combination being
determined by the skill and industry of the labor component. Given
this type of production function, the size of the output depended
on whichever factor was the scare factor-and the Congress clearly
believed that labor was the scarce factor: "For a century to come,
the population of our country cannot reach such a state of redundancy at materially to reduce the [high] rate of wages."31 If one
wanted to increase production, then, the principal problem would
be to allocate labor to those employments where the returns to labor
were greatest. Robert Garnett believed that there were increasing
returns to labor in agriculture: in contrast to countries lacking an
equally favorable ratio of labor to "first-class" land, Garnett argued
that for the United States additional unit labor inputs produced
more than equal output increases. In manufacturing, on the other
hand, he felt that at best constant returns were available.32
The definition of national wealth and these four aspects of economic behavior can be thought of as the basic systemic model of the
free-traders. Following from the wealth definition, it is entirely in

...

.

.

Ibfd., Christopher Rankin (Miss. ), p. 2005.
Ibid., George McDuffie ( S.C. ), p. 2407.
30 Ibid., p. 2180.
31 Ibid., Timothy Fuller (Mass.), p. 1706. An even more explicit statement comes
from the tariff side: "in this thinly populated country, labor is what we want"
Ibid., Henry Martindale ( N.Y.), p. 1643.
32 Ibid., pp. 1683-84.
28
29
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terms of real goods; prices and money are left out, because they do
not affect the underlying "real" processes. We see at once that the
free-traders have developed the essential elements of what is now
known as the classical model: the amount of production is based on
the amount of labor input; all markets are cleared, including the
labor market, by the force of competition; the productivity of labor
is determined by its employment (the division of labor) and skill
(the state of technology).
This model was made dynamic by introducing an historical
growth pattern. Agriculture is the first stage of production, and
when it is sufficiently well-established, it provides capital for the
second stage, foreign commerce. As commerce expands and agriculture matures, both provide capital resources for manufacturing, the
third and final stage. Interference in this progression, for example
by the introduction of a tariff, would divert resources prematurely
and would result in an insufficient foundation for the most advanced
stage, thus precipitating f a i l ~ r e . 5 ~
As is typical of a classical model, this model is an optimistic one:
if left unfettered, the economy would naturally move to an equilibrium that results in full employment and the optimal product output.
Christopher Rankin's reply to the problems posed by wartime dis~)
ruption of markets ("time alone restores the e q u i l i b r i ~ m " ~characterized the general faith in this view of the economy.
The model is not complete; it does not develop either a theory of
distribution or saving, and it leaves implicit how consumer desires
get translated into production decisions. But when it is recalled that
the debaters were Congressmen rather than economists, this model
will be seen to be remarkably appropriate. I t deals concisely with
the economic questions raised by the tarriff: it defines national
wealth, describes how production is organized, and provides a
framework for analyzing the effects of policy changes on production
and wealth. I t is also clear that this type of model is exactly the one
in which the gains from free trade are the greatest-and therefore
provides the best justification for opposing the tariff.
Prices, Money, and Interest. When we introduce the free-trade
Congressmen's notions of money and prices, the simple model developed above begins to lose its innocence; but it remains essentially
a real-good model. While there was considerable confusion sur33
34

Ibid., pp. 1935,2253.
Ibid., p. 2020.
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rounding the monetary system and its relation to prices, it was generally held that money and prices merely reflected the underlying
real processes. There was no "natural price" concept analogous to
that of Smith or Ricardo. Prices were simply set by the supply and
demand conditions prevailing in the market. Daniel Webster, for
example, ascribed high wartime prices to the augmented demand
caused by unusually high government expenditure^."^
Prices also were seen to depend on the quantity of money in circulation: "Paper issues of our banks carried the same effect [of enhancing prices] still f~rther.'"~However, demand was somehow
independent of either money prices or the amount of money available, and reflected only the underlying "real" demand for the
arti~le.3~
The interest rate-properly seen as a return to a factor of production-was taken as an index of the amount of money capital
available relative to the demand for it. Here it seems there was no
distinction made between real resources for investment and financial
resources. The current American interest rate was thought to be
somewhat higher than the comparable British rate due to the assumed abundance of British ~apital.3~
Because of their fundamental belief in the "real" economic processes, the free-trade advocates saw no dangers in international
pricing or the balance of payments. Specie wodd move in the direction of high demand.39In response to movement of specie, international prices would adjust. But since product demand depended
only on the demand for the article (and not on money prices), there
would be no output or employment effects resulting from the specie
m~vernent.~'Consequently, the balance of payments problem was
"exploded."
Specific Tarif Arguments. The fragments gathered above into a
''model)) were of course scattered throughout debates dealing specifically with the tariff. But now that we have seen what kind of economic conceptions lay behind the tariff arguments, we are in a
position to understand the nature of those arguments themselves.
The free-traders contended that a tariff would diminish the na35
86
37
38
39
40

Ibid., p. 2031.
Ibid., Daniel Webster (Mass.), p. 2031.
Ibid., p. 2050.
Ibid., p. 1940.
Ibid., p. 2019.
Ibid., p. 2053.
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tional wealth by causing future additions to the stock of that wealth
to be smaller than would be the case in the absence of the tariff.
The argument was developed along two lines:
1) The tariff reduces or precludes the benefits derived from an
international division of labor: "With the labor of ten days, I can
buy a piece of cloth manufactured in England; whereas, the same
sort of cloth, manufactured in the United States would cost me
twelve or thirteen days labor, or a value equivalent to that. These
are my reasons . . . [for opposing the tariff] ."41
2 ) The tariff, by encouraging a different allocation of resources,
reduces the total domestic output. In the first instance, a tariff encourages too much capital, i.e., that of the inefficient producer, to
enter and remain in the
Secondly, it coerces resources
into less profitable uses by taxing the consumers to provide a bounty
for certain i n d ~ s t r i e s The
. ~ ~ cost of this resource diversion is precisely the opportunity cost-the goods that could be produced if the
scarce labor had been employed in other occupation^.^^
The tariff opponents refuted both the balance-of-trade argument
and the employment problem by refusing to admit that they existed.
An unfavorable balance of trade would cause a change in international prices, that is, exchange ratios, which in turn would correct
the trade imbalance. But this correction would have no iduence on
domestic employment. Finally, competition was assumed sufEcient
to keep the wage rate at the full employment level, so there could
be no legitimate argument for the traiff in terms of correcting domestic employment patterns.
The Pro-TariffPosition
The tariff advocates were not so fortunate as their opponents in
inheriting a useful conceptual scheme from the contemporary political economists. Their model remained in a cruder state of development, and their arguments tended to be primarily non-economic
in context. The legislators were familiar with the old mercantilist
philosophy expounded by Steuart and others, but the mercantilist
model had been thoroughly discredited intellectually by Smith's
Wealth of Nations. What emerges as the conceptual framework for
41
42
43
44

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

Lewis Williams (N.C. ), p. 2111.
p. 1925.
p. 2086.
p. 2062.
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the pro-tariff position is actually two lines of thought: mercantilist
economics and, what is more interesting, a modified KeynesianSmithian system.
We notice first that some of the pro-tariff Congressmen simply
refused the arguments of Smith. They accepted a definition of
wealth in terms of precious metals: "To be sure, we get an equivalent for our money (in trade), and perhaps more, but we consume
it. . . . England gets our money, and she does not consume it. This
is the secret of her wealth and of our p~verty.'"~
With such a definition of wealth, the importance of the favorable balance of trade
naturally follows: "She [a wise nation] should sell what she can: buy
only what she must."46 For these mercantilists, then, the question
of the tariff was essentially one of correcting an imbalance of trade
through restricting imports.
The Keynesian-Smithian Framework. The larger portion of the
tariff advocates accepted the contributions of the Wealth of Nations,
but made some very surprising modifications that changed the
policy implications of the model. Smith's definition of wealth in
terms of the real goods available to society was considered correct.
Also accepted were the observations about economic behavior, specifically the division of labor and self-interest, made by the freetraders. However, it was the free-traders' (and Smith's) assumption
of full employment at equilibrium that was disputed by those supporting the tariff and that motivated the insightful modification.
Employment was seen as being directly related to the level of
production:
If a farmer has no market for his surplus productions, the supply of his own
wants will be the measure of his exertions; and if there be no foreign demand
for the surplus produce of the country, the industry [i.e., employment] of the
nation will be limited to the supply [i.e., supplying the effective demand] of
the nation. The want of a market
effectually limits the exertions of industry.47

. ..

But it was also known that aggregate production could exceed the
demand ("market") for goods: "[Prosperity or high employment requires that a society possess] a market for the sale and exchange of
the surplus of the produce of the labor of its members. This market
45
46

47

Ibid., Henry Martindale (N.Y.), p. 1655.
Ibid., Henry Martindale (N.Y.), p. 1644.
Zbld., Salas Wood (N.Y.), p. 2073.
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should be competent to the absorption of the entire surplus of prod ~ c t i o n . "And
~ ~ if the market demand was not great enough, there
would be unemployment:
The products of our agricultural labor begin to be limited to the quantity
necessary for mere subsistence, lest the surplus perish on hand for the want of
a market at home or abroad. . there is a want of employment. How, then,
can the greatest number of hands be most productively employed? This is the
problem to be solved.49

. .

Or, more simply, "Production exceeds consumption, and a portion
of the people are without occupation, for want of empl~yment.'~
Personal consumption clearly depended on income in this model:
"The farmer was consuming these importations to the extent of his
ability to purchase. . . . [High war-time income] enabled him to
sustain, for a time, habits of expense and indulgence to which he
Finally, it is clear that the tariff adhad not been accu~tomed."~~
vocates did not view involuntary unemployment as a condition of
temporary disequilibrium: "Permanent excess of production over
consumption is the only correct criterion [for determining whether
foreign trade must be developed]."62
It was recognized that aside from the private hardships sufFered
by those who lost income because they were unemployed, there
were national wealth implications to unemployment as well. Unemployed labor was a wasted resource, particularly considering that
labor was assumed to be the scarce resource, and therefore: "The
interference of Government to procure employment for the surplus
population is required to increase the wealth of the nation."* The
Congress of 1824 was thus led to ask what, in terms of economic
thought, is a remarkably modern question: "Is full employment provided by the nature and distribution of our occupations?"64Though
the employment problem is seemingly posed here in structural terms,
actually it is more one of aggregate demand: with most of the pop48 Ibid., Henry Clay (Ky.), p. 1966. Also: 'Production w
ill exceed the consum tion of the country and new branches of industry will become necessary." Ibii..,
Salas Wood ( N.Y. ) , p. 2072.
49 Ibid., James Strong (N.Y.), p. 2127.
50 Ibid., Salas Wood (N.Y.), p. 2073.
51 Ibid., Henry Martindale (N.Y.), p. 1634. See also p. 1965 for similar statements by Henry Clay.
52 Ibid., Salas Wood (N.Y.), p. 2072.
53 Ibid., Salas Wood (N.Y.), p. 2074.
54 Ibid., Henry Martindale ( N.Y. ), p. 1633.
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ulation engaged in agriculture and supplied with manufactured
products from Britain, there simply was insufficient "market" or
"consumption" to keep labor employed. The answer given to the
rhetorical question above was that there were no markets, that is,
demand, for the farmers7products.
What we see here is a forerunner of an essentially Keynesian
income-determination model. The Keynesian model is by no means
described in full, but what is given is central to what was later the
Keynesian innovation, excluding, of course, the major contribution
of liquidity preference theory. We can describe a very simple Keynesian model in three equations:
1) Y = C + I
2) C = f (Y)
3) N = @(Y)

where:

Y is income
C is consumption
I is investment
N is employment

Investment is exogenous, and income, consumption, and employment are determined in the model.
In order to translate the words of the debates into something
analogous to this Keynesian model, we need to remember:
1)that we are dealing with a predominantly agricultural economy,
where investment and consumption were largely in the hands of the
individual farmers, and distinguishing between the two was impossible.
2) that "market" or "consumption" for the Congress meant what
aggregate demand" means to the modern economist, including foreign demand and the government sector; for example, on government demand, "[War] compensates the diminished consumption. . .
by the people, by the extraordinary consumption of the government."65
3) that "excess production7' was generally the difference between
the fixed size of the farm crop and that amount neither sold in the
market nor consumed by the farmer himself; it would be called "unintended farm inventory investment" in modern terms; however,
there is no reason why it could not include the much less important
excess industrial production as well.
Then we can write the model in three equations:

6'

55

Ibid., George McDufEe ( S.C.), p. 2406.
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1) P,+, = C,

+ C, + Cf

where:
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P,+, is output either sold or consumed
b y the producer

2) Cp = f (P,+c)

C, is private consumption of domestically-produced commodities including
business consumption (investment)

3) N = +(PB+c)

Cf is exports
C, is government consumption (any government GNP purchases)
N is employment

Goverment spending and foreign demand58are exogenous, and outpput sold or consumed by the produced, private consumption, and
employment are determined in the model. We can add a fourth
equation to define excess production:
4 ) pu = pt

- p,+,

where: P, is excess production
Pt is the total actual production (output)

Now total actual production is exogenous (determined by size of
crop planted, etc.) and excess production is determined in the
model.
We notice immediately that this model is nearly identical with
the simple Keynesian model described earlier.
I t is unquestionably exaggerating the case to formulate fragments
of various speeches into mathematical or any type of formal model.57
But such formulation is really not what is at stake-what is important is that in the minds of the tariff advocates there were these
essentially Keynesian notions: the level of employment related to
aggregate consumption and equilibrium with involuntary unemployment.
It is not difficult to see how such sophisticated notions were arrived at. The United States had been involved in commercial strife
66 It does not do great injustice to the tariff advocates' position to make exports
exogenous, since American trade was seen as a small part of total world trade; however, to satisfactorily account for their view of both exports and imports, one would
logically need to introduce the entire monetary sector into the model. Basically,
specie flow was seen as the regulator forcing nations to purchase abroad only to the
extent that they sold abroad. However, these views were never systematized. See,
for example, Zbid., Henry Clay, p. 1962 ff. and Salas Wood, p. 2068 ff.
57 We must remember that in none of these speeches was there any open attempt
to create such a model; in this sense, all of the passages from the debates are taken
out of their contexts. But the purpose of this paper is to go behind (or outside of)
the context to see what notions the Congress had about the economy.
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or actual warfare from 1807 until 1815. This period was marked by
two significant developments: the collapse of foreign trade, particularly imports, and greatly increased government expenditures. Yet
these were also remarkably prosperous years, at least in the minds
of Congressmen. The return of peace saw large amounts of imports,
diminished government expenditures (in fact, repayment of the
debt), and great unemployment. Such conditions were correctly perceived by several speakers,58and their observations resulted in the
model above.
Other Theoretical Notions. We find little else original in the way
of further development of the model. Henry Clay advanced the idea
that the demand for money is in proportion to the amount and activity of national wealth (Keynes transactions demand for money?),
but he tended to confuse money and income, and thus the value of
his insight was vitiated. He did correctly understand the discriminatory effects of deflation and inflation on the debtor and creditor
classes.59
While the "reaI goods" definition of nationaI wealth was accepted,
the tariff advocates were somewhat more curious about the origin
- of
wealth than their opponents. Their conclusion, if we assume an
equivalence between Clay's loosely defined "wealth" and Ricardo's
more precise "value," followed strictly Ricardian lines: "Labor is the
source of all wealth, but it is not natural labor only; . . . [but also]
the power of ma~hinery."~~
Pro-Tarif Implications and Arguments. As one would expect, an
analysis based on the Keynesian model outlined above results in
typically Keynesian policy implications. Full employment becomes
a policy objective, and therefore: "It is the duty of Government
to provide employment for all those whom the existing branches
of industry will not accommodate, and who are idle for want of
empl~yment."~~
Perhaps the most persuasive argument for the tariff, then, relates
to the aggregate employment benefits to be derived. It was thought
Annals, pp. 2406,2020,1965.
Ibid., p. 1965.
Ibid., Henry Clay (Ky.), p. 1973. Compare Clay's statement with the following
by Ricardo (P~inciplesof Political Economy and Taxation, London, 1817, Chapter I,
Section 111): "The exchangeable value of the commodities produced would be in
proportion to the labor bestowed on their production; not on their immediate production only, but on all those implements or machines required to give to the particular labor. . .
81 Annals, Salas Wood (N.Y.), p. 2017.
58
59

."
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that consumption of domestically-produced articles (C,) would increase as a result of introducing the tariff; that is, it was expected
that the function f(Ps+e) would shift. Furthermore, if this shift
could be purchased at minimal export loss, then employment would
increase significantly. Nearly every speaker in favor of the bill mentioned employment, and the following is typical: "The object of the
protecting duty is to give employment to a multitude of persons who
are now idle."62
The tariff supporters argued two further points in favor of the
measure:
1) Infant industries: Perhaps derived from Sir James Steuart, who
strongly emphasized this argument, but clearly showing the Hamiltonian influenceYB3
the case for protection of infant industries was
used nearly as frequently as the employment arguments. It was understood that protection should be temporary and involved short-run
costs; however, when combined with the employment argument, the
costs were thought to be slight. Currently unemployed American
resources would become employed, thereby compensating for the
short-run losses which would result from diminished tradeeB4
2) Prevention of dumping: As a result of several "auctions" at
which shiploads of British manufactured goods were sold at very
slight prices, the tariff advocates urged protection against dumping.
It was claimed that British manufacturers would: . . throw away
cargoes of their goods, at reduced prices, or at no prices, in order Lo
break down a growing rival, and indemnify themselves by fleecing
the whole country afte~wards."~~
A Digression on Chapter 23 of The General Theory. J. M. Keynes,
in his chapter entitled "Notes on Mercantilism", in The General
Theory, notes that there can be two employment-stimulating effects
of a favorable balance of trade: the direct effect of increasing aggregate demand through foreign investment, and the indirect effect of
reducing the domestic interest rate, which stimulates domestic investment and increases effective demand. He then searches the
mercantilist literature to discover whether or not these effects were

".

Ibid., John Wright (Ohio), p. 1502. See also pp. 1964, 1642, ,2407.
See Hamilton's Report on Manufactures of December 5, 1791 (reprinted in
McKee, Samuel Jr., ed., Papers on Public Credit, Commerce, and Finance by Alexander Hamilton; New York: Columbia University Press, 1934); especially pages
203-206.
Annals, pp. 1472,1553,1990,2071,2263.
66 Ibid., John Tod (Pa.) ,p. 1473.
62
63
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known to those who proposed protective tariffs; he concludes that
both effects were recognized, but that "The mercantilists perceived
the existence of the problem without being able to push their analysis to the point of solving it."66
Whether or not they can be described as "mercantilists," the tariff
advocates of 1824 were not only aware of the employment implications, they in fact devised a theoretical framework that could explain
it. Their confusion concerning the role of money prevented them
from having any idea of the indirect effect, but their conception of
the direct stimulus of import restriction was nearly complete. European markets were shut to American agricultural products, with the
exception of cotton and tobacco, and the American market was
flooded with foreign manufactured goods. Given this structural
arrangement, it appeared that a tariff that would prohibit or greatly
reduce the flow of imports must of necessity dramatically-and
favorably-change the balance of trade, even after allowing for
potential retaliation; if one is buying but not selling abroad, retaliation is irrelevant. These mercantilists expected the employment
benefits to be great.
The pro-tariff position, then, was significant in that it refuted the
prevailing economic doctrine on intellectual grounds; its proponents
refused to be content with commonplace statements that the classical doctrine was fine in theory but did not work out in practice. Instead, they proclaimed that on the employment question the classical
doctrine was wrong theoretically-a claim which was not recognized
by the economists until a century later.
Quasi-Economic Arguments. There were also a series of quasieconomic arguments used on each side, the principal ones relating to
the preservation of national sovereignty through economic independence, the development of a "balanced" economy to foster national
unity, the need for federal revenue, and national defense requirements. We need only be concerned here with those arguments that
were recognized by the free-trade economists as valid.
Adam Smith admitted four cases for which tariffs could legitimately be established:
66 J. M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (New
York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1936) Chapter 23, section IV. J. A. Schumpeter, in
History of Economic Analysis, gives a somewhat fuller description of mercantilist
thought on the employment problem; he concludes that ':jsome of the mercantilist
writers went to surprising, in fact to Keynesian, lengths. (p. 350). The present
case seems a good example of that.
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1) to protect defense industries,
2 ) to offset domestic excise taxes,
3) to retaliate against foreign tariffs before negotiation,
4) to introduce free-trade gradually.
Of these four cases, only the first is frequently discussed in the debates. There existed slight excises on "alcoholic spirits," but since the
duty proposed was considerably higher than the excise, the second
argument was not used. The third case was mentioned briefly, but
it was assumed that Britain's policy was inflexible and therefore this
argument was inappropriate. The 1816 debates were concerned with
the fourth case, the need for adjustment, but by 1824 de facto free
trade had existed for nine years-the duties imposed in 1816 being
wholly inadequate to slow the flow of imports.
It would seem that since the free-traders placed such great store
in Adam Smith, the tariff advocates would have used his arguments
for trade restriction to undercut the free-trade position. From what
we know of the Congress's familiarity with The Wealth of Nations,
we can be fairly sure that these cases of "legitimate7'trade restriction
were known. One can only speculate as to the tactics involved which
avoided these defenses of the bill.

The years 1824 and 1894 can be seen as polar opposites in the
evolution of American tariff policy. In 1824 the commercial condition was one of virtual free-trade, but a majority of the newly-elected
Congress was pledged to institute a systematic policy of protection.
In 1894, the country had experienced thirty uninterrupted years of
increasing protection and high tariffs, culminating in the high
McKinley Tariff of 1890. In 1892, however, the Democratic Party
had been swept into complete control of the national government
on a specific platform of "tariff for revenue only." The Congressional
debates in both 1824 and 1894 were exceptional since in both cases
the basic issue was protection versus free-trade rather than the more
limited question of t a r 8 revision.
A few general comments about the 1894 debates are in order before we turn to the specific arguments advanced by each side. The
debate monopolized House business for most of January, 1894, requiring over two thousand pages in the Congressional Record to
report it. Regional differences, i.e., the free-trade South and Border
States opposing the manufacturing North, made some impact on the

Richard C. Edwards
final vote,"7 but in the end strict party voting prevailed: the Democrats voted in favor of the bill 193 to 15, the People's Party in favor
9 to 1, and the Republicans against the bill 123 to 0.68
Concerning the substance of the debates themselves, we readily
detect from reading these debates that a considerable body of economic doctrine existed which was popularly accepted and which
therefore belonged to the "public domain." Simplistic notions of supply and demand, division of production into wages and profits, and
competition were common to most members of the Congress. However, in contrast to the 1824 debates, the later debates made little
explicit use of the writings of professional economists. David Hume,
Adam Smith, and J. S. Mill were mentioned, but only perfunctorily.
Alfred Marshall, Frank Taussig, and J. B. Clark, all of whom were
contemporaries and had published important works prior to 1894
which were relevant to the tariff issue, were apparently not known
and their works did not play any major role in the debates. Whatever influence economics authors had must have come through the
writings of much more contemporary and policy-oriented authors
such as Richard Cobden,B9Edward Atkinsonyo and Edward StanBut in general, the debates do not give evidence of the
Congressmen having much familiarity with the works of professional
economists.
Also in contrast to the situation in 1824, in 1894 a vast amount of
statistics was available from the census. The ubiquitous citations of
long series of data reveal more about the Congressmen than about
the economy: the speakers had no conceptual means to organize the
data, and beyond computing averages, had no techniques to deal
with them. Obvious problems were encountered in attempting to
decipher the effects of price changes, drawing international comparisons from different bases, and dealing with the distinction between trends and other types of variation. The lack of a theoretical
framework, however, was a more serious limitation, rendering meaningless attempts to use empirical evidence. The overwhelming difEi67 That, for example, is how the Democratic votes against the bill can be explained.
68 The vote is reported in Record, p. 1994. Congressmen can be identified by
party in the Joint Committee on Printing, U.S. Congress, Oficial Congressional
Directoy, Fifty-Third Congress, Second Session (Washington, 1894).
69 Record, p. 711.
70 Zbid., p. 802.
71 Zbid., p. 805.
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culty was simply an inability to separate theoretically significant
data from the rest. The appeal to "consult the facts" was, of course,
irresistible; unfortunately, it was rarely meaningful or decisive.
The 1894 debates only peripherally touched on the aggregate
problems of employment, output, and growth. While there was considerable discussion of such concepts as labor and the "nation's ind ~ s t r y , "it~is~ clear from the language that the primary perspective
was that of micro-analysis, a perspective that looked to the individual firm or entrepreneur for economic laws that could be applied
to the entire nation.73 The lack of an aggregate perspective can
probably be traced to two influences: 1 ) the nation had enjoyed a
relatively long period of prosperity and growth, during which mass
unemployment and other macro-problems were perceived as shortlived; 2) the development of professional economics, aside from
Marx, tended to focus on micro-analysis, and so at least there was
no pressure from this quarter to consider macro aspects.
A more difficult problem was that of separating the effects of
tariff changes on the workingman qua wage-earner from the effects
on the workingman qua consumer. Clearly the Democrats, and to a
lesser extent the Republicans, took as their goal bettering the workingman's standard of living. Yet with few notions of the relevant
price, income, and wealth magnitudes involved, differential analysis
of the impact of various tariff policies was almost impossible.
Finally, the Fifty-Third Congress found it difficult to separate the
effects of thirty years of protection policy from other economic developments during this period. Wages, profits, output, and wealth
had grown tremendously in these thirty years. The only free-trade
basis for comparison was the pre-Civil War period, clearIy not very
valuable for judging tariff policy in the 1890's.
With this understanding of some of the background and general
problems involved, let us turn to the specific models posited by the
two party groups.

Republican Confusion
When we turn to a systematic study of the protectionist position,
we find that the Republicans presented a curious model, seemingly
profound but at bottom an almost classic case of economic nonsense.
The usual argument made for a protective tars-an argument gen72

73

Zbid., Charles Be11 (Texas), p. 551.
Zbid., W. B. Cockran ( N.Y. ) ,Appendix, p. 18.
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erally conceded to have theoretical justification-is that the dynamic
gains from protection may outweigh the static gains from free trade.
But this was not the argument presented, and we can easily see why
it was ignored. First, American industry, and certainly those specific
industries that claimed protection, could in no way be described in
1894 as "infants;" the case for industrialization through infant industries tariff protection was not viable. Second, what we might call
Keynesian employment problems were thought to be random and
temporary, a sentiment bolstered by the recent history of presumed
high employment and growth. Also, defense was not a major concern. America had not been at war with a foreign power in almost
fifty years, and, anyway, defense technology did not at that time require highly specialized industries. The more esoteric argument of
bettering the terms of trade was not raised simply because it was not
perceived. And finally, the argument that protection was needed to
encourage diversity of industry, thereby avoiding the problems of
instability due to narrow product specialization, was never made;
for obvious reasons, the American economy was already highly
diversified.
The Trade Model. What the Republicans did present as their
model is a mixture of confused insight and common misconception.
At the base of the model is a labor theory of value: "The single and
only source of wealth is labor."74 All goods produced, including
capital, are the products of labor and can be costed at their laborinput values: ". . . capital is nothing more or less than labor in another form or state; it follows that it must have cost in proportion to
the price of labor that produced it. . . ."76 The real cost to society
of any production, then, is simply the labor that directly or indirectly
went into that production process. The Republicans drew the usual
conclusions from this first premise, for example, that labor-saving
inventions increase wealth.78
When the Republicans turned to the question of trade, the only
basis they admitted of was that of absolute cost advantage: "It
would be impossible to bring imports from the other side [of the
Atlantic] here . . . if it were not for the fact that these articles are
produced upon a cheaper scale in the Old World. . .
However,
74 Zbid., John Dalzell (Pa.), p. 652. All of the quotations in this section are taken
from speeches by Republican Congressmen.
75 Ibid., M ron Wright (Pa.), p. 811.
78 See I b d p. 771.
77 Zbid., Charles Daniels (N.Y.
), p. 779.
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the Republicans did agree that if the imported goods were produced
cheaper abroad than here, then they should be imported: "No protectionist holds that the protective policy should be applied to any
industry which must be carried on here under natural disadvantages,
that is, where a larger amount of labor is permanently required
to make or produce a given article here than is required elsewhere. . . ."78 That is, national wealth would be increased if the
imported goods cost less in labor than the same goods would have
cost if they had been produced at home.
Starting from this view of the proper role for trade, the Republicans were led to their justification, indeed theoretical imperative,
for tariff intervention by their unique system of calculating labor
costs. Real production costs to a society are, they maintained, the
direct and indirect labor costs of that production; and it is these
costs which form the only legitimate basis for trade, as Dingley's
statement above makes clear. It is only when labor costs, in terms of
real labor inputs, are lower abroad than here that trade will increase
the wealth of the country. These labor inputs are determined by the
technological conditions, that is, the state of knowledge and the resource endowment. But trade naturally is carried on in money
values, not labor values, and in fact the only ultimate cost component, the price of labor, is set by supply a i d demand conditions
in the labor market: ". . . wages are made [i.e. determined] by supply and demand if all the elements affecting supply and demand are
To the Republicans, these "supply and
taken into con~ideration."~~
demand conditions" relate principally to relative scarcity, somewhat
to institutional arrangements, but not at all to labor prod~ctivity.~~
The problem, then, is that there may be divergence between money
labor costs and real labor costs, with the market catering to money
costs but gains-from-trade considerations depending on real labor
costs: "The money prices of domestic products are determined by
the cost of production, . . and when they cost more in money than
abroad it is simply because labor receives higher wages."s1 In other
words, the natural trade advantage, that is, lower real labor cost,
might not coincide with lower money costs. The Republicans argued
that in fact for most goods real labor costs were the same or lowers2

.

78
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81
82

Ibid., Nelson Dingley (Maine), p. 731.
Ibid., Nelson Din le (Maine), p. 733.
See for example i % i hpp. 731,788, 638.
Ibid., Nelson Dingley (Maine), p. 730.
For any individual good, the American (real) labor cost might be lower, higher,
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in America than abroad, but that money labor costs were higher
than abroad. Therefore, in the free market, the United States would
import goods that could be made with less real labor input here than
abroad but higher money cost, and this importation would codict
with the Republican absolute-advantage theory of how wealth was
increased through trade. Protection, then, was needed to cover the
disparity between money and actual labor cost comparisons. The
market would thus be led to a "correct" solution, in which the proper
goods would be traded in the proper amounts in order to maximize
the gains from trade.
The essentials of this model can be seen schematically, but with
some loss of information, as follows:
let subscripts refer to United States ( a ) and rest of world (w)
define RC = "real" (labor) costs of production
MC = "money" costs of production
then:
( 1 ) RC, = f [(technology),; (resources),]
( 2 ) RCw = f [(technology)W; (resources),]
and:
(3) Real Gains from Trade = f [RC,; RC,]
J.

,

(3a) Real Gains from Trade = f

.;

also :
( 4 ) MC, = f [(supply of labor) (demand for labor).]
( 5 ) MCw = f [(supply of labor)W; (demand for labor) ,]
and:
(6) Market Trade = f [(MC,; MCw)]
or specifically:
MCW
(6a) Market Trade = f
-

[rn]

The Republican theory of the size of the tariff was expressed in
the Republican platform of 1892 and quoted by Rep. Dalzell: ". . .
that on all importations coming into competition with the products
of American labor there should be duties levied equal to the differor the same as labor costs abroad, depending on the relevant technology and resources; and this relationship should determine whether the good gets traded or
not However, taking all oods, general roductivity differentials favorable to Ameri- labor wme explicitly k i e d ; See I&, pp. 895,731,788,658.
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ence between wages abroad and at home."83 Or again, a tariff should
be: ". . . a duty which covers the difference of money cost of production and distribution here and abroad of an article which can be
produced or made here substantially to the extent of our wants without natural di~advantage."~~
Expressing in more generalized and symmetric but mathematically equivalent form, we can write:
RCw
taritf=[=--1

(7)
or:

MCw
MC,

[MC~I

[g+ ""-1 [-I

CW
= R
RC,

(7a)

when this tariff is imposed, equation (6a) changes to:
Market Trade = f

(8)

[MCLV+~ar8]

and substituting (7a) into ( 8 ) :
(9)

Market Trade=f

[%I

thus forcing the market to be dependent on the same variables as
equation (3) depends on.
We can see quickly the working of this model from a simple example. Suppose that real labor costs were RCw = 3 and RCa = 2;
then, according to Republican theory, we should want this good
priced at a 3:2 ratio. However, suppose that MCw = 2 and MCa = 4.
This is precisely the case that the Republicans claimed obtained in
most markets: the actual cost of the American good was as low or
lower than that of the foreign good, but the money price, pushed up
by high wages and a high standard of living, was higher. Then a
tariff would be imposed (equation 7) :

%
:[

MCw]
-MCa

21

[MCa] = [34 =4
2 4
then the goods would compete in the market at the price ratio of
MCw tariff : MCa or 2 4:4 = 6:4, precisely the ratio of RCw:RCa.
tariff =

+

8s

M

+

Ibid., John Dalzell (Pa.), p. 651.
Ibld., Nelson Dingley ( Maine), p. 727.
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It is clear now that the logic of this model (in either its descriptive
or schematic form) brings us to an inevitable conclusion: given the
institutional environment posited by the Republicans, a tariff was
essential for protecting and augmenting American wealth.
fur the^ Points About the Model. The Republicans attempted to
document their case by measuring money labor costs according to
weekly wages, not as a cost per unit of output:
The proprietor of one of these English shops told me that his pay roll averaged
.
a pound ($4.86) per employee per week. The average [American] pay roll
was last year $2 per day or $12 per week; and these two shops are probably
fair averages of those on corresponding work in the two countries. I will not
dwell on this point, as this difference in wages is not now disputed.
.85

..

..

It must be noted here that if as claimed there were no productivity
differentials between countries, and if the work week was of the
same length, then weekly wages are indeed an appropriate measure
of labor costs. These observations led the Republicans to typical
"pauper-labor" conclusions, including a declaration that free-trade
is unfair: "Give the American manufacturer foreign wages and he
will fear no c~mpetition."~~
And in the absence of a tariff, American
wages would necessarily decline: ". . . But [free trade] . . . involves a reduction of wages to the level of Spanish and Cuban
labor. . . ."87
As a slight digression from the development of this model, we
might pause here to consider one of the implications of what has
already been said. If we accept the claim that there were no productivity differentials between European and American labor, then
the higher American wages must have resulted from one of two
situations:
1) American labor was paid more than its marginal product; that
is, capital was receiving less than its marginal product. However,
the Republicans were clearly not sacrificing the returns to producers
in order to achieve higher real wages for labor:
There is no difference of interest between classes on this question. [The tariff]
is either better or worse for all classes; . it is a necessity of the case, if
[factories] do run, that there shall be a profit in running them, equal at least
to the average profit of other business in the country.88

. .

85
86
87
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Ibid., William Draper ( Mass. ) ,p. 802.
Ibid., William Draper ( Mass. ), p. 805.
Ibid., Julius Burrows ( Mich. ), p. 577.
IMd., William Draper (Mass.), p. 802.
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2 ) Alternatively, foreign labor was paid less than its marginal
product, and foreign capital more than its marginal product. But the
Republicans likewise rejected this situation, by accepting the notion
that foreign producers also received less than their marginal product: "Free trade discourages production among our own people because the foreign producer can live cheaper, and work cheaper, and
sell cheaper. . . ."89 Why both foreign labor and capital should be
so perverse as permanently to accept lower returns than their marginal products is, of course, never explained.
The protectionists' insistence on absolute advantage as the only
basis for trade led them to a narrow view of the adjustments that
would follow the opening of freer trade. In the first instance, they
were unable or refused to see that while some industries would
necessarily decline, others might grow: "One industry after another
would be destroyed by this low-priced labor abroad, and pauperism
Secondly, they feared that there
would be increased in Arneri~a."~~
were not enough industries with an absolute advantage over foreign
competitors to keep the labor force employed: "We have no advantageous industries which can employ all our labor in the production
of commodities whose excess over and above our own consumption
can find a market elsewhere. . . ."91
The Republican model is easily recognized as a somewhat refined
combination of the "pauper labor" and "scientific tariff" arguments.02
Its basic fallacy, of course, lies in its confusion between real costs
and values and money costs and valuesQ3It is clear from the model
that one cannot consistently maintain that both real wages and real
profits are higher in the U.S. than abroad and also maintain that
there are not productivity differentials as well; one cannot cut the
same pie into larger pieces for everyone. But this inconsistency
emerges only from the model, and in fact is seen only by lifting the
model from its massive rhetorical context.
From the limited scope of this study's data, it is not possible to
tell how much of the model was believed and how much was dictated by political necessity; but if we choose to trust their sincerity,
Ibid., Binger Hermann (Iowa), Appendix, p. 508.
Ibid., Albert Hopkins (Pa.), p. 638.
91 Ibid., Mamott Brosius (Pa.), p. 746. See also p. 607.
92 p. T. Ellsworth, The Intemtioml Economy, 3rd Edition. (New York: The
Macmillan Company ), 1964, pp. 227-230.
93 This is a confusion that the Congress of 1824 avoided by refusing to discuss
money variables; it documents the argument made above that consideration only of
real values was a tremendous and important simplification for that Congress.
89
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the Republicans in Congress demonstrated little understanding of
the economic process.

Democratic Innocence
The Basic Tarif-Reform Model. When we turn to the Democratic
position, we find that the tariff-reformers were as ambitious in their
schema and as naive in their observations as the Republicans. The
Democratic majority in Congress took as its principal tariff-reform
goal the raising of real wages paid to labor. The tariff bill of 1894
proposed to achieve this rise in real wages by focusing "reform" in
two areas: first, it put raw wool, iron ore, coal, and lumber, all raw
materials, on the duty-free list; second, it reduced the duty on such
items as refined sugar and steel, which were produced domestically
under trusts or combines.
Precisely how cheaper raw materials would get translated into
higher real returns to labor is explained by the tariff-reform model.
In the opening speech of the debate, William Wilson laid out the
basic position:
[The workingman's] wages depend on the products of his labor. Whatever
goes as a tax into the material he uses is a diminution of the wages of the
laboring man. As you cheapen his materials,
you enable him to put his
finished products on the market at prices that wilI rapidly and indefinitely increase [his wagesl.04

...

The fundamental proposition for the model that emerges from
Wilson's statement is the two-fold relationship of wages: wages vary
directly with the value of output and inversely with the price of
other variable inputs.
The second feature of the model is most clearly explained a little
later in the debate:
If

...

the supply should exceed the demand [for any good], competition
amongst the owners of the commodity would cause the price to decline until
they could only obtain the cost of their possessions and a reasonable compensation for the use of their capital invested and for their personal services.05

The proposal stated here is simply that in a competitive system excess profits should be zero: the return to capital is "a reasonable
94 Record, William Wilson (W. Va.), Appendix, p. 196. All of the quotations in
this section are taken from speeches by Democratic Congressmen.
95 Ibid., Charles Bell (Texas), p. 550.
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compensation," in addition to which the entrepreneur receives payment for his managerial services.
The third condition, needed to make this model viable, is that real
inputs are somehow directly related to real output, in some sense a
production function; phrasing the connection rhetorically, W. B.
Cockran asks: "Is it axiomatic in political economy that the capacity
of an individual to employ labor bears a fixed relation to the amount
of capital at his disposal? And is the same rule applicable to nations
that applies to individual^?"^^ Later he answers his own question:
"[When you diminish] production you diminish the amount of labor
and the quantity of materials employed in produ~tion."~~
The fourth point is also contained in the portion of Cockran's
speech quoted above: the model is essentially a micro-economic
picture of a firm generalized to the entire economy. The "generalization" process is a simple carry-over, in which conclusions about parts
are expected to hold for the whole; the methodology proceeds on the
assumption that the "rule applicable to nations" is derived from
observing individuals.
We are now in a position to gather the above elements into a
model, along with certain simple definitions, and view the system
critically. Profits, including return to capital, are simply the difference between total revenue and total operating costs:
(1) r = T R - T O C

where:

.~r
= profits
TR = total revenue
TOC = total operating costs

Total revenue is output price times quantity:
(2) T R = P o * Q

Po
Q

= output price
= output quantity

Total operating cost is composed of labor cost plus the cost of raw
materials:
(3) TOC = wL

+ P,M

w

L
P,
M

=wage rate

= labor
= price of raw materials

= raw materials

These simple definitions were part of the "public domain" of economic knowledge and are thoroughly documented in the debates.
Substituting ( 3 ) and (2) into ( 1 ) gives us:
96
97

Zbid., W. B. Cockran (N.Y.), Appendix, p. 16.
Ibid., W. B. Cockran (N.Y.), Appendix, p. 17.
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Equation ( 4 ) is an exceedingly short summary of the basic model,
but given two assumptions it reflects the tariff-reform thinking remarkably well. The first assumption is that under conditions of competition profits are constant; that is, we assume T is fixed at the level
Secondly, based on their recent exof "reasonable compen~ation."~~
perience of having the labor force nearly at full employment for a
considerable period, the Democrats assumed that the effective labor
force could not be expanded much in the short-run; that is, the labor
supply was believed highly inelastic above the contemporary employment level.
Let us now examine the effects of the tariff bill in terms of equation (4). The first part of the bill reduced the tariff on, and therefore the prices, P,, of raw materials. If P, declined and .lr remained
constant (by the competition assumption), then qualitatively there
are five possible adjustments simply to balance the equation:
1) M could increase;
2 ) L could increase;
3 ) w could increase;
4 ) Q could decrease;
5 ) Pocould decrease.
We remember that Q, L, and M are related in fixed proportions.
Thus if adjustments (1)or (2) occur, both must occur and Q must
necessarily increase also. But L is assumed fixed upwards at full
employment, and thus (1) and (2) cannot occur.99
The possibility of adjustment (4) is likewise excluded, since competition would not permit reduced production in the face of reduced
input prices. M and L would also have to decrease, by the fixed proportions argument, further reducing input prices.
Finally, w could increase (adjustment 3 ) or Po could decrease
(adjustment 5 ) ; either one of these or some combination of both
would be possible, each being a single adjustment having no wider
repercussions in the equation and each capable of exactly offsetting
the decline in prices of raw materials. These adjustments were precisely those which the tariff-reformers expected, because each also
This dubious assumption is investigated more fully below.
Certainly if there were unemployed labor resources, adjustment (2) would
be beneficial; in fact, it was recognized as a possibility: "If production be unrestricted by law we believe trade [i.e., production] will increase so that the demand
for labor in this country will exceed the supply . . . and the result of the competition
will be to raise his wages and improve his candition. . . Record, W. B. Cockran
( N.Y.), Appendix, p. 18.
98

99

."
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would raise the real wages of labor. The following statement, expressed in negative form, accurately reflects the expectation of ( 3 )
and (5):
Under [the tariff system], which increases the cost of the goods, or rather the
selling value of the goods made by the protected manufacturer, you diminish
the purchasing power of the wages of the laborer while
. you have already
reduced the compensation he receives for his labor.100

..

The second part of the tariff bill aimed to reduce the duties on
those goods produced domestically under trust or combine arrangement. Again with reference to equation ( 4 ) : ". . . protection enables
manufacturers to obtain better prices for their products. . ."lol By
restricting competition, the trusts were able to raise profits above the
"reasonable compensation" level; that is, the increase in Po due to
the tar& was met by a rise in r: "Active foreign competition being
shut out by a high protective tariff. . . . [the trusts] kill competition,
arrange prices to suit themselves, and regulate production according
to demands at their high extortionate price."lo2 Thus in practical
terms the workingman was simply faced with higher prices, hence
lower real wages. So by reducing duties on these consumer goods,

.

real wages were likewise raised.
Equation ( 4 ) and its accompanying behavioral assumptions represent the brief essentials of the Democratic vision of the economic
system. At the least it was a plausible attempt rationally to reconcile
the goals of tariff reform with the specific tariff reform chosen.
Shortcomings in the Model. To the modem economist-indeed, to
the economist of 1894--the model depicted in equation (4) appears
extremely nalve. The arguments based on it represent a good example of theoretically valid policy conclusions resulting from underlying theoretical confusion. There is first the failure to take account
of Keynesian problems: the levels of national output, employment,
and prices are really not considered in the aggregate. However, more
serious shortcomings arise in attempting, as the reformers did, to
use the model as an accurate micro-analytic description. There are
at least five theoretical problems that arouse suspicion as to the
validity of the model, even in its limited micro application:
1) The most obvious is that there is no reason for profit levels to
100
101
102

Ibid., Michael Harter ( N . Y . ) , p. 740.
Ibid., Charles Bell (Texas), . 550.
i b d , William Breckinridge PKy. ), p. 716.
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remain constant as opposed to profit rates being equal. Competition
will insure that "excess7' profits are zero in equilibrium, but this only
insures that rates of profits between industries be equal, not that
overall profits somehow remain fixed. Once we release T to vary,
then, there is no assurance that declining materials prices will get
translated into higher real wages. Even in a completely static economy, changing relative prices will not in general leave aggregate
profits constant. In fact, it was known that the capital stock was
growing: "Capital increases from year to year in any country by the
amount of its product that is saved from consumption."103The question becomes much more complicated when there is positive net
investment and total income is rising. However, so long as the reduction in tariffs does not call forth such a large increase in profits as
actually to reduce real wages, then the constant profits assumption
can be relaxed without serious damage to the model.
2) The model completely disregards capital. Certainly various
tariff policies would have differential effects on the application of
and returns to capital, yet these problems are never explored. The
notion of constant variable-input-output relations (i.e., fixed coefficients between variable inputs and output) does not appear to be
a significant limitation, since the possibility of substituting capital
for labor was recognized. However, leaving capital out of consideration restricts the applicability of such concepts as substitution of
inputs.
3) "Raw materials7' is a difficult concept to define in terms of a
modern industrial economy. The Republicans forcefully pointed out
that materials inputs to one firm are simply outputs to another-and
this problem becomes increasingly complex as the number of production stages between initial producer and ultimate consumer increases, as obtains with industrial progress. The total effect, then, on
real wages is no longer unambiguous: for example, if the price of raw
wool declines, and assuming that this decline gets translated into a
decline in the price of woolen goods, then the real wages of woolens
consumers go up but those of workers in the production of raw wool
may go down. Without some concept of magnitudes, it is not clear
what has happened to real returns to labor.
4 ) The tariff reform model leaves out of consideration the critical
problem of whether labor was a relatively scarce or abundant factor.
l
a

Ibid., W. B. Cockran (N.Y.), Appendix, p. 18.
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The effects of tariff changes on relative income shares cannot be determined in ignorance of the relative scarcity.
5) Comment (4) refers to division of a fixed income, but there
is also the problem of effects on growth of income, which the model
likewise ignores.
The Sophisticated Free-Trade Position. In addition to the na'ive
tariff-reform model presented above, the more militant free-traders
posited relatively more sophisticated notions; in fact, their version
approximated the economist's classical comparative-cost trade
model. Charles Bell put forth the essential postulate of this theory:

. . . in fact the more they [people] trade the richer they get if each receives
from the other something he needs which it would have taken him longer to
produce than it did to produce the article he parted with for it. When people
are not hampered by restrictive legislation, . . experience soon demonstrates
where the various necessities or luxuries of life can be produced with the least
expenditure of labor, and they adapt themselves to the conditions prescribed
by the laws of nature.104

.

The importance of the above statement is that Bell compares the
real cost of a desired imported article to the real cost of the exported
good for which it is traded, rather than to the cost of the desired
article if produced at home. The latter comparison is, of course, the
absolute-advantage case, which was recognized as well; as usual, it
evoked the typical plagiarism of Smith's "hothouses in Scotland"
argument.lo5But Bell makes the much stronger statement of comparative advantage, exposing consumption possibilities based on a
trading line. This was a significant advance over the Republicans'
previous recognition of only the absolute-advantage case, which, as
we saw, led them to fear "pauper" labor.
To complete our survey of the free-trade assumptions, we need to
introduce three further strands of thought:
1) There was a clear understanding of the difference between
weekly wages paid to labor and labor cost per unit of output: "It is
undoubtedly a fact that laborers of all kinds received better compensation in this country than elsewhere, if we estimate it in money by
the week; but if we estimate their compensation by the results
accomplished, then such is not the case."lo6Or again, ". . . invention
renders labor so efficient that we can maintain the rate of wages, that
Ibid., Charles Bell (Texas), p. 555.
Ibid., p. 555.
106 Ibid., Charles Bell (Texas), p. 550.
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we can shorten the hours of toil and still cheapen production."lo7
This distinction, so obvious to economists as to be hardly worth noting, is crucial to any clear view of the relevant economic processes;
yet this distinction was not admitted by the Republicans.
Further, it was seen that high real wages were possible because of
the high productivity of the American worker: "The higher the skill,
the higher the intelligence; the higher the capacity, necessarily the
higher the wage. . . ."lo8
2) The Democrats understood the static argument that lower real
domestic production resulted from tariff restriction, and that this
decline inproduction occurred precisely because the tariff acted as
a subsidy to inefficient industries. Both inefficient firms in an otherwise efficient industry and entirely inefficient industries, in terms of
international comparisons, would be subsidized by a tariff: "[the
tariff] encourages men to engage in trades that they cannot carry on
in equal competition. . . ."109 Finally, the cost of supporting inefficient industries was seen as precisely those goods which were foregone in the production of goods which were produced.l1°
3) There was an implicit recognition of the terms-of-trade problem, although the influence of a tariff on the terms of trade was skillfully avoided. But in the case of expert bounties granted by the
German and Austrian governments to their sugar exporters, and
against vehement Republican claims of unfair competition, the freetraders argued that ". . . if Germany is fool enough to spend money
to give our people cheap sugar, . . . let her do it. . ."111

.

SOME CONCLUSIONS ABOUT CONGRESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND THE NATURE
OF CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE

In concluding, we must note first the inescapable impression that
both sides in the 1824 debates showed themselves extremely knowledgeable-they knew what the political economists were saying and
they were clever in making original observations about the economy.
While generally confused about money and prices, the Congressmen
were nevertheless clear on the problems of resource allocation, income and employment levels, thk gains from trade, and growth.
The Congress of 1824 refused to accept as applicable to a national
107 Ibid.,
108 Ibid.,
109 Ibid.,
110 Ibid.,
111 Ibid.,

W. B. Cockran (N.Y.),Appendix, p. 14.

William Breckinridge (Ky.), p. 711.
W. B. Cockran (N.Y.), Appendix, p. 16. See also pp. 740,659.
p. 740.
John Warner (N.Y.),p. 660.
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economy those common-sensical postulates on which a good business
is managed. In some cases they came up with wrong notions, but
they did produce important insights relevant to an economic system.
Less concretely, there was in the 1824 debates a tone of honest inquiry directed at discovering economic knowledge; their inquiry met
with notable success.
I t is generally claimed that the tariff advocates had a large majority of votes when the 1824 debates began, but that during discussion
of the bill they were "outgeneraled by the free-traders and lost
much of their majority.l12While the problem of what motivated men
to vote as they did is beyond the scope of this paper, we can observe
possible intellectual reasons for this claim: the free-traders inherited
their model in complete form from the political economists and were
able to employ its arguments from the opening day of the debate;
on the other side, the tariff advocates began with no model and only
slowly developed one in the course of the debate. Given this vast
difference in original endowments, perhaps the most remarkable
aspect of these debates is that the tariff advocates were eventually
able to present such a cogent defense of the bill on theoretical
grounds.
It is readily apparent that comparison of the debates of 1824 and
1894 reveals a regression of Congressional understanding of the
economy. Despite having available a more complete set of data and
a fuller theoretical description of the economy by professional economists, the later Congress demonstrated an inability to develop an
economic perspective commensurate with the analytic task at hand.
The Congress of 1894 displayed none of the intellectual curiosity
of their predecessors. The policy positions were strictly defined before the debate and never weakened. The intellectual justification
for either program was not carefully prepared or subjected to tests
of consistency. There was little discussion of long-range effects beyond emotional or irrational predictions of economic disaster or increasing bliss.
This description of the economic sophistication of the American
Congress at the beginning and end of the nineteenth century supports the hypothesis that the nature of Congressional debate itself
changed during this period. Despite the geographical consistency of
112 For this view, see Edward Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies in the
Nineteenth Century ( Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1903),pp. 204207.
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the actual voting, the content of the debates makes clear that the
earlier Congress convened for honest debate and discovery of knowledge through mutual interchange of ideas. The later Congress debated the issue only as a formality to be endured before the final and
entirely predictable vote. The explanation of the difference between
the two periods might well be sought in the respective contexts of
interests and values in which the debates were staged.
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